that partiality may be justified is not to be ruled out by stipulation, the basis of comparison cannot be 'favour him more than one should, or more than one may'. So I will take partiality to be acting or being disposed to act in ways that favour one person more than others (whether more than some others, or more than all others), when doing so expresses favourable attitudes and emotions one has towards that person.
Given the complex emotional aspects of some attachments, and especially given that they may carry negative emotions, like resentment or anger, they are sometimes perceived to give rise to reasons that do not favour their objects. Partiality 3 implies a favouring, so the question of how attachments give rise to reasons is wider than the question of the possibility of justified partiality. There may, however, be special difficulty with the justification of partiality. Such difficulties also affect matters other than attachments. Possibly we have reasons to be partial or to act in ways that are 2 One view that I ignore here is that morality consists of those considerations that can be established from the moral point of view, which is inherently impartial -that is what makes it moral. Constructivists are committed to something like this. Without a constructivist foundation a point of view is simply a partial view, defined by what it excludes. If one defines morality as sound reasons other than reasons of partiality then obviously morality conflicts with reasons of partiality. But being interested in the way sound reasons cohere there is no point in our attending to such an artificial restriction.
4 partial to our relations or to our country or to our employer, whether or not we are attached to them.
But is there a difficulty about reconciling partiality with morality? There would be if one thought that reasons which display partiality always override those that do not, As desires are not reasons, I feel that the point is better expressed by saying simply that even given the agent's attachment to his wife, the reason to save her is not necessarily conclusive. It is unconditional and valid, but it may be defeated by conflicting reasons. Though my way of explaining how it is that reasons that express partiality are pro tanto differs from Barbara's, the two ways are fundamentally at one.
She explains:
In the wide range of cases, the role of the Kantian motive of duty is as such a limiting condition: it expresses the agent's commitment that he will not act (on whatever motive, to whatever end), unless his action is morally permitted. Thus, in the case of bringing aid to someone in need, it would be quite ordinary for the action of the normal moral agent to be overdetermined 5 : he might act from the emotion-based desire to help (meeting the other's need would thus be the direct object of his action), and he would act from the motive of duty (the permissibility of what he was doing would be a necessary condition of his acting to help). Barbara Herman, 'Integrity and Impartiality ', The Monist, 66 (1983) 234 at 246. 5 In commenting on the passage I will ignore its description of the situation described as one of overdetermination. That idea implies two independent routes, each one sufficient in itself for the same outcome.
But that is not what Barbara has in mind. She describes a situation in which two components generate an outcome, each being necessary and neither of them sufficient to bring it about.
5
Here is how I see the case: in acting to help a person in need for a reason that expresses the agent's feeling for the other the agent at least implicitly endorses the view that the reasons for his or her action are not defeated by conflicting reasons.
As you see I am avoiding here the question of what actually motivates, i.e. causally explains the action -a matter to be dealt with later -and most significantly I do not suggest that the agent acts from a motive or reason of duty. It is merely that he or she would not have acted as they did if they thought that the reason for the action is defeated. That is, of course, not a point about their moral dispositions. It merely expresses the fact that the action is not irrational, not akratic, the agents are not acting against their better judgement. Whether this aspect of the nature of rational intentional action gives succour to the Kantians is not for me to judge. It does, however, help remove some suspicion about the relations between reasons that express partiality or attachment and moral concerns. Barbara observes:
[E]ven when morality permits mothers to act for their children first among others … I do not act for my child because morality permits it, but because I am his mother. Well, yes and no. The mother is acting because of both facts, in that she would not have acted if the reasons for the action were defeated by moral reasons against it.
8
But things being as they are, the fact that there are no decisive moral reasons against the action is not and cannot be her reason for the action: the absence of a reason is not a reason. The only reason for her action is the undefeated reason to act for her child.
b Partiality and moral impartiality
Given that reasons, actions for which expresses partiality, are merely pro tanto, are they suspect in any way at all? Perhaps the difficulty is in the claim that morality is impartial. Barbara thinks that impartiality consists in observing the maxim that 7 Barbara Herman, 'Agency, Attachment, and Difference ', Ethics, vol. 101 (1991) 775 at 780 8 It is worth noting that if moral reasons are a distinctive set of reasons they may militate against the action without defeating the reasons of partiality or attachment for it. enjoins people to treat like cases alike. 9 However, she believes, as I do, that that requirement is empty. 10 I will dismiss the pedantic observation that since all cases are alike in some respects and different in others the maxim requires one to treat all cases in the same way, but that is an empty requirement because all modes of treatment are likewise alike in some ways (while being different in others). It seems natural to understand the maxim as requiring one to treat alike cases that are alike in that the same reasons for action apply to them. So understood the maxim avoids the pedantic objection. But so understood the maxim does no more than enjoin us to act for reasons that apply to us. We need no maxim for that to be true of us.
That follows from the very idea that reasons apply to us. Therefore, unlike Barbara, I do not see the rejection of the maxim as a challenge to the claim that morality is impartial, as I do not think that the maxim is about impartiality. Being empty it is not about anything.
Partiality, to repeat, is favouring. It is possible that one has reasons to favour one person over another. But do such reasons conflict with morality? No doubt, we should be impartial or act impartially in some contexts, and sometimes that would involve a conflict with reasons believed to be generated by our attachments. A teacher whose daughter is one of the children in his class should act impartially towards all his students, and that may be difficult. There would be occasions in which one should avoid being in a situation in which these difficulties are encountered. But is morality impartial in the stronger sense, meaning that all moral reasons are impartial?
It is a difficult question as well as an easy one. Given that there is no theoretically significant body of considerations that constitutes morality one may, as we inevitably do, draw the boundaries of morality in different ways on different occasions, and none of these ways has claim to be the correct one. So, for example, some may Of course when we deal with people we deal with particular people. We often must identify the individuals whom we have reason to treat one way or another through the use of singular reference. But when we have reason to deal with them as we do that is because their case falls under a reason whose content can be stated without the use of singular reference.
The obvious reply is to invoke again the standard argument -(3) One has reasons to favour one's children because (1) Favouring one's children is part of, or contributes to, a parent-child relationship that is valuable or good.
(2) The value of that relationship yields a reason for parents to favour their children.
That NR is my child is a reason for me to favour him because this is an instance of a reason, namely that parents have reason to favour their children.
The standard argument shows that the partiality of attachments is not in itself suspect. It raises no doubts about their ability to provide reasons. But it leads us straight into the real problem. Barbara states it thus:
When I attend specially to the needs of my children and friends because I am partial to them, either I have acted as I ought not (morality requires that I count their needs no more than others'), or I have done what I ought to do, because there are obligations to one's children and friends, but I have done it the wrong way: my actions were expressions of my partiality, not of my moral understanding and commitments. (776) We can dismiss the first horn of the dilema. Morality does not forbid us to favour our children and friends, or so I -along with Barbara -shall assume, meaning that while some forms of favouring are immoral, not all are. The difficulty is understanding how it can be right to express our partiality not as an instance of doing our "moral" duty.
At least part of the problem is with the way the standard argument was presented.
It seems to explain the value of -say -parental relationships. That value provides reasons for everyone, not only to parents and children. For example, strangers should respect the relations between parents and children. Sometimes, when the relationship is in trouble they should help parents and children repair the ruptures.
Governments should help people sustain close relations with their children, and so on.
The standard argument can explain how the value of an attachment provides universal reasons of these kinds. But can it explain, e.g., the value of a friendship to the friends? Assume that the friendship between Abby and Betty is good for both of them. Values being universal, the objection goes, it follows that there can be someone else, call her Carol, such that if Abby were friends with her their friendship would have the value to Abby that her friendship with Betty has. In that case, Abby has no reason not to replace her friendship with Betty with a friendship with Carol, assuming that she can do so. But that is clearly false, and it shows that universal values cannot account for the value or practical importance of relationships and attachments. It follows that universal values cannot explain the reasons attachments give to those attached. Friendships, one is inclined to say, are with a particular person, not with the bearer of some good qualities. For Abby her friendship is with Betty -with that individual person, not merely Betty as a bearer of some good qualities that Carol may also have, or come to have.
It is not easy to make sense of the objection. Of course the friendship is with a specific individual, but Abby cannot even recognise her friend except through some of her features, features that may well be shared by others. All her beliefs about her friend, everything she feels her friend to be or have, can be expressed as ascribing to her friend some properties that can (in an a-temporal sense) be possessed by other people. Perhaps the objection is that it is wrong to think that the significance of the friendship for Abby is exclusively in Betty's good qualities. She may like Betty because of her awkward gait, her bent legs, her infuriating contrariness, etc. To be sure, people's affection for others, and whatever dependence on them evolves through their common history, does consist of reactions to features that are not themselves evaluative, and not necessarily commonly seen as endearing.
11 But if the friendship is good, and if the affection and mutual dependence contribute to its significance, then those features are themselves good in one way or another.
It is time to address directly the issues of uniqueness and non-fungibility. Our friendships and other attachments are unique to us. That, however, is consistent with the fact that they are made unique by universal properties. It may be that for Abby her friendship with Betty is special because it was with Betty she had her first satisfying sexual experience, or because it was Betty who nursed her back to health when she had pneumonia, the first serious illness of her life, etc. In each case what makes Betty special and important to Abby is that she relates to her in a way in which many people can relate to one another. Many people were someone's first satisfying sexual partner, many people nursed someone to health from their first serious illness, and many others could have played these roles. Nevertheless, so far as Abby is concerned Betty is unique. She relates to Abby in ways in which now no one else can. And these relational properties are, to Abby, significant. They are part of what makes her friendship with Betty unique, and uniquely valuable.
That means that no other friendship will be the same, will have the same good aspects as the friendship with Betty. It does not mean either that that friendship is the best there can be, or that it would be wrong to end it in order to have another friendship, when the two conflict.
I have illustrated the point using the example of dramatic events in people's lives.
Many friendships and other attachments do not share such dramatic events, and for those who share them such events need not be the most important aspect of the meaning of the friendship. With time more and more is shared among people, and some of it becomes -for one reason or another, and they need not be important reasons -significant for them, changing, cementing or undermining the ties among the friends. Uniqueness is created by the significant historical-biographical features of the friendship. And the role of all the significant historical features of a friendship or other attachment, is explained by theories that fall within the value-based approach.
The objector may reply that while it is true that such historical properties make the relationship unique to the friends, and while they may be valuable properties, they are not the reasons people have for valuing their friendships, at least they are not always among the reasons people have for valuing the friendship. That may be so.
The observations above address the familiar tension between the feeling that attachments are valuable because of the evaluative properties that they or their objects have, and the feeling that each attachment is in some sense unique and irreplaceable -we can lose one attachment and acquire others that are no less good and enriching, but they will be different. In some significant dimension we will not be replacing like with like. We may, for example, while conceding that the new attachment is no less valuable than the lost one, and that it enriches our life no less than the lost one did, nevertheless mourn the loss of the lost one (and not merely the circumstances of its loss). 
Attachments and the right reasons
The conclusion of the discussion so far is that if there is any puzzle about the possibility of reasons that express attachments it is not because they favour some over others, and therefore not because they express partiality to some over others.
Such partiality and such favouring are not always defensible, but they are not suspect in themselves. When vindicated, the standard argument shows them to be valuable because they are instances of universal values that have acquired a special significance in the life of the people whose attachments they are. I will therefore now return to an examination of attachments only. The puzzle about them (though not only about them) is that the standard argument that establishes which attachments are valuable seems ill suited to provide the reasons that those attachments appear to provide.
To begin we should examine the ways in which attachments affect our reasons. I will consider only one type of attachment, though a large and varied type: friendship.
The problem we face now is how to understand personal meaning or value, and
how it affects the reasons we have.
a Incommensurability of reasons and the impact of feelings & attitudes
Two broad situations present different problems. In the first one acts to cultivate a new friendship or to enhance the significance of an existing one, or one acts to protect an existing friendship from ending, or deteriorating. In the second friendships exist that do not need repairing, enhancing or defending. The first category involves actions for the sake of the friendship, whereas the second does not. There when actions affect the friends one can be said to be acting out of friendship, one is acting as a friend.
Let me start with a story. Suppose you ask me about Jack: Isn't he an interesting think that I will try to become friends with her'. 'Why do you want to be friends with Jill?' you ask. 'You know', I say, 'she is interesting, and easy to get on with, etc.
etc.' 'But so is Jack' you say. 'I know, but I just do not feel like being friends with him'. 'Do you mean', you ask, 'that you like Jill better than Jack?' 'No,' I reply, 'I like them both'. 'Do you suspect', you ask 'that you will be more successful in By the same token, on other occasions people will prefer, again faced with incommensurable reasons, those options that do involve their friends. Suppose Jill is now a friend. I may feel like spending time with her, doing something with her. Not because she is a friend, but because she is Jill, though I would not have felt like that had she not been my friend.
So far I have emphasised a number of ways in which friendship may be at work, but not as a normative reason. Rather, the web of feelings and attitudes that constitute its instantiation in this person or that causes people to act intentionally, that is for reasons, but the reasons do not involve the friendship, and do not fully explain the action. The feelings and attitudes associated with the friendship complement the normative explanation of the action, and it is they that account for the choice to be or act with the friend.
b Friendship as a reason
You may think that in detailing some ways in which attachments can affect our conduct even when they do not feature among the normative reasons for which we act I am trying to minimise the difficulty of explaining how the value of friendship can be a reason for action out of friendship. But my aim is not that, but the need to identify the kind of situations in which attachments, friendships, not only affect our conduct but do so because we act for (normative) reasons, which they constitute. I described two kinds of situations in which our actions are explained by our friendships but where the friendships do not figure among the (normative) reasons for which we act. First, when we act for reasons, but the reasons are not conclusive.
They are incommensurable with conflicting reasons, and what makes us choose the option we do are our feelings and attitudes about and to the friendship and the friend, feelings and attitudes that explain our actions without being our reasons for them. Second, there are cases in which we want to do things with or for the person who is a friend but our reason is that he or she is that person: I want to do things with or for Jill, because I take pleasure in doing things with or for her. Not because she is a friend, but because she is Jill. Possibly, I would have felt the same had she not been a friend. As things are, our friendship explains why I feel that way. But that is not part of my (normative) we do our friendships, caring about them, and about our friends, it is natural that we have reason to express these facts, not only to reassure our friends, but out of the need to express how we feel, to make plain or reaffirm how we feel.
But even though much of what we do within a friendship has that expressive value, and can, and often is, done partly to express our attitudes to our friends and friendships, this is not yet the central case, nor perhaps the most troublesome case.
The key to the way in which friendships give reasons lies in the fact that they are with their friends). The friendship is part of the reason for such action, the part that says that the action is appropriate in the context of the relationship. Sometimes, however, one has no other reason for taking the action, nor is one emotionally moved to take it. One may even be reluctant to take the action, and take it unwillingly with various degrees of reserve or resentment, simply because one knows (or believes) that one owes it to one's friend.
c Have we solved the puzzle?
You will remember the puzzle I set out to solve. In Barbara's words - That is, however, merely a description of the simple case. Often the reasons and motivations will be more complicated -one may have reason to reassure the other of one's commitment to the relationship; one may feel a need to rekindle in oneself the emotions that one thinks one ought or one wants to have towards the other; one may simply be aware that given the relationship one owes this or that to the other and do so reluctantly ---and the complexity of human life and of human emotions guarantees an indefinite number of more complex reasons and motivations.
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Conflict and aggregation
Some may feel that I have not yet confronted the main difficulty. It is often discussed through examples: May I save my friend, rather than any of the others, just because she is my friend? Or suppose that three are at risk, and I can choose between saving the two on the left and saving the one on the right, and the one is my friend, or my mother, or child. May I save the one rather than the two, just because of my attachment to her? Or, indeed, may I not do so? Is it permissible to save the two rather than my mother?
That possession of other evaluative qualities provides reasons independently of being a person, does not in itself entail that the strength of the reasons they provide is greater than the strength of the stronger reason among them. It is possible that the reason not to kill Jane because she is a person is as strong as the reasons not to kill her due to the combined facts that she is a gifted musician and a person. But unless one assumes that none of the other evaluative qualities of persons makes a difference to way one should conduct oneself towards them the question is one of detail: a question of when favouring is justified rather than whether it can be (noninstrumentally) justified.
A value-based account is one according to which reasons are provided by the value of things, by the fact that certain actions, people, events and more possess value properties of a variety of kinds. As we saw, evaluative properties are 'impartial' in being universal. Given that being persons endows people with value, in as much as people count because they are persons they all count just the same. But they possess other non-instrumental value properties, and these differentiate between people. In as much as they differ in their evaluative features we have different reasons to behave differently to different people.
Partiality to oneself
It is frequently assumed that whatever one's verdict about other partialities, partiality to oneself must be justified for it is inevitable, or rather it can be avoided only by suppressing powerful natural motivational dispositions, and by distorting one's existence as an agent. I believe that partiality to oneself is never justified and that it is often thought to be justified because it is confused with agential asymmetry.
As this is an important point I will take some time to explain it.
Every person is both the agent of his own actions, and in some cases, one of their objects, one of those affected by them. Other people are merely the objects of his actions (though joint action is another important category, with mixed roles for others). That is the obvious, but nonetheless the basic asymmetry. It explains some of the phenomena that are often mistaken for partiality for self. Agents are sometimes affected by a variety of motivational dispositions a few of which can be confused with a disposition to be partial to oneself. Take, to start with, the common belief that people are naturally partial to themselves in that they are liable to choose the action that, they believe, will better serve their own interest, even when aware that the alternative is supported by better impartial reasons. It is at best only partially true, and to the extent that it is, that is for reasons other than those assumed by those who hold it. To simplify let us concentrate on those actions that are in the agents' interest because they are instrumentally valuable in serving the agents' (worthwhile) goals.
There is no general reason to think that these goals are or will all be self-regarding, that they are or will be the pursuit of pleasure by the agent, or the pursuit of knowledge by him, etc. At least some of them may be other-regarding goals like looking after one's children, contributing to political causes, studying to become a doctor in order to have a socially useful job, etc. Whether or not preferring one's interests displays partiality to oneself appears to depend, at least to a degree, on what one's goals are. It may do so if the goals are self-regarding, but not otherwise.
Of course, if one's goals show partiality to one's children or others, then one's preference for doing what serves one's interest, while not manifesting partiality to oneself, may be infected by partiality to one's children.
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A disposition to prefer one's interests does not amount to a disposition to favour oneself. Possibly, however, action that serves one's interests may be due to a different disposition, one that can more properly be described as a disposition to favour oneself. Agents sometimes have a preference for being active, and for being in control. Imagine a simplified situation: we can either achieve a certain result by our own action, or let someone else secure the same result, perhaps getting him to secure it by paying him to do so. Not infrequently one has a preference for achieving the result oneself, and such preferences may lead one to take the wrong action, that is to try to secure the result oneself rather than get someone else to do so, when the latter would be better. More indirectly, the preference for being in control may lead to action, sometimes unjustified action, furthering one's own interests. As we saw, successfully furthering one's own interests is empowering. It enhances one's ability to achieve one's goals. But it is important not to confuse the preference to favour one's interests which results from a preference for being active and in control with taking oneself, implicitly or explicitly, as deserving special favours, or as counting for more than others.
The preference for being in control is but one of the motivational malformations that may afflict agents. It is paralleled by an opposite preference, also often to be found, namely the preference to avoid responsibility, a preference for not being in 17
Here another complication comes into play. Reference to interest is at home when the action supposed to be in one's interest either serves a self-regarding end (getting a ticket to the performance of the Bach cantata) or serves an unspecific end, as most self-interested actions do. These actions serve or will serve unspecific goals which one has or will come to have: one saves money now to have the means for whatever one would want to do in 20 years time, etc. That is, when the self-interested action is taken, that it will advance the end that it will, in the event, serve is not the reason for taking the action. Suppose I borrow a car to be able to take my child to school. It would be odd to say that it was in my interest to borrow the car. If so then partiality to self has to be treated as a motivational malformation. But why assume that it is unjustified? Why not assume that one should, or may, be partial to oneself? Because that way of understanding the partiality is inconsistent with the combination of (a) the view that agents do not have a reason to promote their own well-being, and (b) the view that partiality to self consists in favouring one's own well-being. Without rehearsing the full argument for (a) it may be helpful to lift the veil and look at its main presupposition, which is that our well-being consists in the whole-hearted and successful pursuit of worthwhile ends -to repeat the sound bite I repeated many times before. One's well-being may consist in alleviating poverty, treating the ill, defending the oppressed, just as it may consist in going on wine tasting holidays, textile tours of South-West China, or other self-regarding activities and pursuits. It all depends on what one's goals are.
The result is that one cannot choose one's non-instrumental goals to serve one's well-being. Rather one chooses one's goals for their merit, in light of one's tastes and inclinations, and they determine what one's well-being consists in and thereby also what serves it, what is in one's interest. It also follows that partiality to self, understood as favouring one's own well-being, need not mean preferring selfregarding activities and goals over other, e.g., over moral goals. Whether it does depends on each person's ends in life.
Perhaps we should understand partiality to self as a tendency to favour selfregarding ends. For all I know some people may well have such a tendency. But I do not know of an account that suggests that such a tendency may be justified. Nor do I know of an account that gives such a tendency the appearance of plausibility which
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Alternatively the partiality could be action taken because one falsely believes that one has a reason to pursue one's well-being. Such false belief does not itself manifest any partiality. Mistakes manifest partiality only when they are the result of partiality, that is if they are caused by one's partiality. And that brings us back to the considerations discussed in the text above.
would warrant attributing belief in its justification to anyone. There are, no doubt, other possible ways of understanding partiality to self. It may, for example, be a tendency to keep with the pursuit of one's well-established ends, rather than deviate from them when weighty considerations point to an overriding case for doing so. A person settled in his work, with his family and other pursuits, may well not respond to the need to help others afflicted by an earthquake or a flood, or whose plight is not sudden but is now pressed upon him. So understood partiality to self becomes a conservative tendency, a tendency to stay with the familiar, a disinclination to change course when there is good reason to do so. Yet again, such a tendency is probably fairly wide-spread, and yet again it need not lead to action that favours one's well-being. A doctor looking after AIDs patients in Uganda may feel the same reluctance to disrupt his moral activities in order to improve his education, or in order to keep up a romantic relationship with someone back home, in Denmark, even though his contribution to his patients in Uganda is now minimal and the better reason is to take the more self-regarding options. As with other ways of understanding the so-called partiality to oneself, it is more appropriately understood as an agential distortion, as motivational malformation.
Some writings express the fear that unless there are limits to the demands of morality one's life as an agent is cramped and distorted. One is merely a device for converting moral inputs into moral output, and one does not have a life one can call one's own. A certain partiality to self is a consequence of the fact that 'concerns and commitments are naturally generated from a person's point of view quite independently of the weight of those concerns in an impersonal ranking of overall states of affairs '. 20 This is a way of understanding Bernard Williams' integrity objection and it may well constitute a valid objection to some moral theories. But it does not justify partiality to self. Our concerns and commitments do arise out of the belief that they are valuable, and drives and desires which are entirely 'natural ' and 20 Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism (OUP, 1982 (OUP, , rev. 1994 56. I use Scheffler's formulation to identify a concern, using it in a way that is somewhat different from his, and against a target different from his.
not sensitive to our view of what reason there may be (e.g. hunger, urge to move one's limbs, need to be alert to one's environment) are rational, for while they are not as sensitive to reasons as our appreciation of literature, their biological sources and role mean that there are reasons to satisfy them.
I conclude that the phenomena normally identified as partiality to self are motivational biases, and I assume that there are various kinds of them, and that they do not necessarily manifest themselves in choices that favour the agent's own wellbeing, nor are they due to belief that one counts more than others do.
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